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ABSTRACT: Many people believe that information
that is stored in long-term memory is permanent, citing
examples of "retrieval techniques" that are alleged to
uncover previously forgotten information. Such tech-
niques include hypnosis, psychoanalytic procedures,
methods for eliciting spontaneous and other conscious
recoveries, and—perhaps most important—the electri-
cal stimulation of the brain reported by Wilder Pen-
field and his associates. In this article we first evaluate •
the evidence and conclude that, contrary to apparent
popular belief, the evidence in no way confirms the
view that all memories are permanent and thus poten-
tially recoverable. We then describe some failures
that resulted from attempts to elicit retrieval of pre-
viously stored information and conjecture what cir-
cumstances might cause information stored in memory
to be irrevocably destroyed.
Few would deny the existence of a phenomenon
called "forgetting," which is evident in the com-
mon observation that information becomes less
available as the interval increases between the
time of the information's initial acquisition and
the time of its attempted retrieval.
Despite the prevalence of the phenomenon, the
factors that underlie forgetting have proved to be
rather elusive, and the literature abounds with
hypothesized mechanisms to account for the ob-
served data. In this article we shall focus our
attention on what is perhaps the fundamental issue
concerning forgetting; Does forgetting consist of
an actual loss of stored information, or does it
result from a loss of access to information, which,
once stored, remains forever?
It should be noted at the outset that this ques-
tion may be impossible to resolve in an absolute
sense. Consider the following thought experiment.
A person (call him Geoffrey) observes some event,
say a traffic accident. During the period of ob-
servation, a movie camera strapped to Geoffrey's
head records the event as Geoffrey experiences it.
Some time later, Geoffrey attempts to recall and
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describe the event with the aid of some retrieval
technique (e.g., hypnosis or brain stimulation),
which is alleged to allow recovery of any informa-
tion stored in his brain. While Geoffrey describes
the event, a second person (Elizabeth) watches
the movie that has been made of the event. Sup-
pose, now, that Elizabeth is unable to decide
whether Geoffrey is describing his memory or the
movie—in other words, memory and movie are
indistinguishable. Such a finding would constitute
rather impressive support for the position held by
many people that the mind registers an accurate
representation of reality and that this information
is stored permanently.
But suppose, on the other hand, that Geoffrey's
report—even with the aid of the miraculous re-
trieval technique—is incomplete, sketchy, and in-
accurate, and furthermore, suppose that the ac-
curacy of his report deteriorates over time. Such
a finding, though consistent with the view that
forgetting consists of information loss, would still
be inconclusive, because it could be argued that
the retrieval technique—no matter what it was—
was simply not good enough to disgorge the in-
formation, which remained buried somewhere in
the recesses of Geoffrey's brain.
Thus, the question of information loss versus
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Nonetheless it often becomes necessary to choose
sides. In the scientific arena, for example, a
theorist constructing a model of memory may—
depending on the details of the model'—be forced
to adopt one position or the other. In fact, several
leading theorists have suggested that although
loss from short-term memory does occur, once
material is registered in long-term memory, the
information is never lost from the system, although
it may normally be inaccessible (Shiffrin & At-
kinson, 1969; Tulving, 1974). The idea is not
new, however. Two hundred years earlier, the
German philosopher Johann Nicolas Tetens (1777)
wrote: "Each idea does not only leave a trace or
a consequent of that trace somewhere in the
body, but each of them can be stimulated—-even
if it is not possible to demonstrate this in a given
situation" (p, 7S1). He was explicit about his
belief that certain ideas may seem to be forgotten,
but that actually they are only enveloped by other
ideas and, in truth, are "always with us" (p, 733).
Apart from theoretical interest, the position one
takes on the permanence of memory traces has
important practical consequences. It therefore
makes sense to air the issue from time to time,
which is what we shall do here,
The purpose of this paper is threefold. We
shall first report some data bearing on people's
beliefs about the question of information loss
versus retrieval failure. To anticipate our find-
ings, our survey revealed that a substantial num-
ber of the individuals queried take the position
that stored information is permanent'—-or in other
words, that all forgetting results from retrieval
failure. In support of their answers, people typi-
cally cited data from some variant of the thought
experiment described above, that is, they described
currently available retrieval techniques that are
alleged to uncover previously forgotten informa-
tion. Such techniques include hypnosis, psycho-
analytic procedures (e.g., free association), and—
most important—the electrical stimulation of the
brain reported by Wilder Penfield and his asso-
ciates (Penfield, 1969; Penfield & Perot, 1963;
Penfield & Roberts, 1959).
The results of our survey lead to the second
purpose of this paper, which is to evaluate this
evidence. Finally, we shall describe some interest-
ing failures that have resulted from attempts to
elicit retrieval of previously stored information.
These failures lend support to the contrary view
that some memories are apparently modifiable,
and that consequently they are probably unre-
coverable.
Beliefs About Memory
In an informal survey, 169 individuals from vari-
ous parts of the U.S. were asked to give their
views about how memory works. Of these, 75
had formal graduate training in psychology, while
the remaining 94 did not. The nonpsychologists
had varied occupations. For example, lawyers,
secretaries, taxicab drivers, physicians, philoso-
phers, fire investigators, and even an 11-year-old
child participated. They were given this question:
Which of these statements best reflects your view on
how human memory works?
1. Everything we learn is permanently stored in the
mind, although sometimes particular details are not ac-
cessible. With hypnosis, or other special techniques, these
inaccessible details could eventually be recovered.
2. Some details that we learn may be permanently lost
from memory. Such details would never be» able to be
recovered by hypnosis, or any other special technique,
because these details are simply no longer there.
Please elaborate briefly or give any reasons you may
have for your view.
We found that 84% of the psychologists chose
Position 1, that is, they indicated a belief that all
information in long-term memory is there, even
though much of it cannot be retrieved; 14% chose
Position 2, and 2% gave some other answer. A
somewhat smaller percentage, 69%, of the non-
psychologists indicated a belief in Position 1;
23% chose Position 2, while 8% did not make a
clear choice.
What reasons did people give for their belief?
The most common reason for choosing Position 1
was based on personal experience and involved the
occasional recovery of an idea that the person had
not thought about for quite some time. For ex-
ample, one person wrote: "I've experienced and
heard too many descriptions of spontaneous re-
coveries of ostensibly quite trivial memories, which
seem to have been triggered by just the right set
of a person's experiences." A second reason for
a belief in Position 1, commonly given by persons
trained in psychology, was knowledge of the work
of Wilder Penfield. One psychologist wrote: "Even
though Statement 1 is untestable, I think that
evidence, weak though it is, such as Penfield's
work, strongly suggests it may be correct." Oc-
casionally respondents offered a comment about
410 • MAY 1980 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGISThypnosis, and more rarely about psychoanalysis
and repression, sodium pentothal, or even rein-
carnation, to support their belief in the perma-
nence of memory.
Admittedly, the survey was informally con-
ducted, the respondents were not selected ran-
domly, and the question itself may have pressured
people to take sides when their true belief may
have been a position in between. Nevertheless, the
results suggest a widespread belief in the perma-
nence of memories and give us some idea of the
reasons people offer in support of this belief.
EVIDENCE PEOPLE USE
Brain stimulation. The most impressive evidence
for the notion of permanent storage seems to come
from the reports that events long forgotten are
vividly recalled during electrical stimulation of
certain regions of the human cortex. Wilder Pen-
field, who is best known for this work, was operat-
ing on epileptic patients during the 1940s, remov-
ing the damaged areas in their brains (Penfield,
1069; Penfield & Perot, 1963; Penfield & Roberts,
1959). To guide himself in pinpointing the dam-
age, Penfield stimulated the surface of the brain
with a weak electric current in the hope of dis-
covering, in each of his patients, the particular
area in the brain that was related to the epileptic
attacks. During this electrical invasion of their
brains, Penfield discovered that certain placements
of the stimulating electrode apparently caused
some of the patients to re-experience events from
their past.
If one looks at accounts of Penfield's work writ-
ten by others, one gets a clear impression of a
phenomenon that is extremely vivid and rather
widespread. For example, the following remarks
are found in popular textbooks of introductory
psychology:
Dr. Wilder Penfield, a Canadian brain surgeon, has
reported that he was able to produce vivid memories in
some of his patients by stimulating certain areas of the
temporal lobes with weak electric currents. One patient
reported hearing a song; in his words, ". . . it was not
as though I were imagining the tune to myself. I actually
heard it." Other patients suddenly relived long-forgotten
childhood experiences. Stimulation of the same cerebral
area always produced the same episode. (Kehdler, 1968,
p. 185)
We are in the operating room of the Montreal Neuro-
logical Institute observing brain surgery on Buddy, a
young man with uncontrollable epileptic seizures. The
surgeon wants to operate to remove a tumor, but first
he must discover what the consequences will be of re-
moving various portions of the brain tissue surrounding
the tumor. . . . Suddenly, an unexpected response occurs.
The patient is grinning; he is smiling; eyes opening when
that area is stimulated. "Buddy, what happened, what
did you just experience?" "Doc, I heard a song, or
rather a part of a song, a melody." "Buddy, have you
ever heard it before?" "Yes, I remember having heard
it a long time ago, but I can't remember the name of the
tune." When another brain site is stimulated, the patient
recalls in vivid detail a thrilling childhood experience.
In a similar operation, a woman patient "relived" the
experience she had during the delivery of her baby, As
if by pushing an electronic memory button, the surgeon,
Dr. Wilder Penfield, has touched memories stored silently
for years in the recesses of his patient's brains. (Zimbardo
& Ruch, 1975, pp. 48-49)
Acceptance of the power of Penfield's stimulat-
ing electrode has reached a far wider audience than
the students of introductory psychology courses.
The following example appeared in an article that
reached millions of Americans—through the New
York Times—just a couple of years ago:
One -of Penfield's patients was a young woman. As the
stimulating electrode touched a spot on her temporal lobe,
she cried out: "I think I heard a mother calling her
little boy somewhere. It seemed to be something that
happened years ago ... in the neighborhood where I
live." Then the electrode was moved a little and she
said, "I hear voices. It is late at night, around the carnival
somewhere—some sort of traveling circus. I just saw
lots of big wagons that they use to haul animals in."
There can be little doubt that Wilder Penfield's elec-
trodes were arousing activity in the hippocampus, within
the temporal lobe, jerking out distant and intimate memo-
ries from the patient's stream of consciousness. (Blake-
more, 1977/1978, p. 88)
It is of interest to examine Penfield's own writ-
ings. In his 1969 work, he expressed a belief in
the relatively permanent nature of memory:
It is clear that the neuronal action that accompanies
each succeeding state of consciousness leaves its permanent
imprint on the brain. The imprint, or record, is a trail
of facilitation of neuronal connections that can be fol-
lowed again by an electric current many years later with
no loss of detail, as though a tape recorder had been re-
ceiving it all.
Consider now what happens in normal life. For a short
time, a man can recall all the detail of his previous aware-
ness. In minutes, some of it has faded beyond the reach
of his command. In weeks, all of it seems to have dis-
appeared, as far as voluntary recall is concerned, except
what seemed to him important or wakened in him emo-
tion. But the detail is not really lost. During the sub-
conscious interpretation of later contemporary experience,
that detail is still available. This is a part of what we
may call perception, (p. 165)
On what did Penfield base these conclusions?
Apparently on his observation of "flashback" re-
sponses.
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bear no relation to present experience in the operating
room. Consciousness for the moment is doubled, and the
patient can discuss the phenomenon. If he is hearing
music, he can hum in time to it. The astonishing aspect
of the phenomenon is that suddenly he is aware of all
that was in his mind during an earlier strip of time. It is
the stream of a former consciousness flowing again, If
music is heard, it may be orchestra or voice or piano.
Sometimes he is aware of all he was seeing at the moment;
sometimes he is aware only of the music. It stops when
the electrode is lifted. It may be repeated (even many
times) if the electrode is replaced without too long a
delay. This electrical recall is completely at random.
Most often, the event was neither significant nor impor-
tant. (Penfield, 1969, p. 152; emphasis ours)
In sum; Penfield concluded that memories are
highly stable, that the brain contains a complete
record of past experience that preserves an in-
dividual's past perceptions in astonishing detail.
In this conclusion, he has provided the strongest
version of a memory-permanence hypothesis—a
view that might be dubbed the "videorecorder
model." The videorecorder concept is clearly an
exciting one, and the science-fiction quality of
Penfield's findings seems to have engendered a
remarkable degree of excitement over the past 20
years.
Hypnosis. Hypnosis is also viewed as a re-
trieval technique that is capable of reactivating
detailed memories that have lain dormant in a
person for many years. The technique enjoys
sufficient popular credibility for various U.S. law
agencies to have used hypnosis as an aid to crimi-
nal investigation since the early 1960s. Many of
the apparent successes deriving from hypnosis
have been reported in a recent book by Eugene
Block (1976) called Hypnosis: A New Tool in
Crime Detection. There, for example, the reader
will learn how hypnosis was used by the Israeli
National Police Force in solving scores of cases.
Also in Block's book are descriptions of the suc-
cessful role that hypnosis played in other investi-
gations, for example, in the case of the Boston
Strangler, of the San Francisco cable-car nympho-
maniac, and of Cleveland's Dr. Sam Sheppard,
accused of killing his pregnant wife, Marilyn.
If one looks at what the "experts" are saying
about hypnosis, one gets a clear impression that
some of them believe it works because of the
permanence of memory. For example, two hypno-
therapists, Cheek and LeCron (1968), wrote in
their book Clinical Hypnotherapy,
It seems that everything that happens to us is stored
in memory in complete detail. Conscious recall is limited
to a very tiny part of total memory. Regression under
hypnosis can bring out completely forgotten memories.
It is also possible to bring them out merely by suggesting
that they will be recalled. In this situation the patient
remembers but doesn't relive the event, (p. 54)
Acceptance of the power of hypnosis has reached
an audience far wider than that made up of re-
searchers in the field. An example is an article
that found its way into the homes of millions of
Americans—through the TV Guide (Stump, 197S).
There readers learned of the case of a 38-year-old
woman whose boyfriend had been murdered. She
saw it happen, but the shock—and heavy drinking
—almost totally blocked her memory. She was
brought to the police station, where a hypnotist,
speaking soothingly, explained to her that the mind
is like a videotape machine. What we observe is
recorded, stored in the subconscious, and available
for recall through hypnosis. Information that she
provided, previously unreported, helped crack the
case.
The article went on to report the enormous suc-
cess that the Los Angeles police department has
had with hypnosis. One spokesman said it had
provided valuable leads and evidence in an im-
pressive 65% of the cases. He further said,
Frequently when someone is shot, raped, beaten or
otherwise attacked, he or she performs a defensive maneu-
ver. They throw up a guard against fright, anxiety, and
other traumas. Acting on survival instinct, they hide the
hurt. Through hypnosis, we make the conscious mind
passive and communicate with the subconscious to release
what's buried there. (Stump, 1975, p. 34)
In sum, many proponents of hypnosis have used
successful memory recoveries to support a version
of a memory-permanence hypothesis. These views,
along with widely publicized examples in which
hypnosis was apparently successful, have been
passed on to laypersons through the popular press.
Spontaneous and prompted recoveries. The
phenomenon of spontaneous recovery, namely, the
fact that some items that seem to have been for-
gotten can and do reappear spontaneously, is well
documented (Crowder, 1976). A spontaneous re-
covery can be a striking phenomenon that would
be desirable to study in the laboratory. How-
ever, because that would be very difficult to do—
the experimenter might be forced to wait all week
for a spontaneous recovery to emerge—psycholo-
gists have tended to do experiments in which par-
ticular cues are provided in an attempt to recover
certain memories. For example, Tulving and
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free-recall situation, providing category cues elic-
ited words that had not been recalled in the ab-
sence of the cues. Thus, prior to being given the
cues, the subjects must have had stored in memory
words that were available but not accessible. This
experiment, together with others that followed it
(e.g., Tulving & Thomson, 1971, 1973), indicates
that retrieval cues are instrumental in eliciting a
desired item from memory.
A different body of evidence suggests that ini-
tially unreported elements of a stimulus tend to
emerge in subsequent dreams, daydreams, doodles,
free associations, and other fantasy activities.
Furthermore, recollections following certain fan-
tasy activities yield a similar recovery of initially
unreported stimulus elements (Erdelyi, 1970).
Such recoveries, whether spontaneous or prompted,
are offered as evidence for the notion that memo-
ries are stored permanently.
Psychoanalysis. Psychotherapists use various
techniques to help their patients bring their anxie-
ties and conflicts into the open in order to deter-
mine where they came from and how to deal with
them. Psychoanalysis is a type of psychotherapy
that concentrates on dreams, fantasies, and other
material from the unconscious that patients reveal
through free association. This sort of treatment
has apparently enjoyed some success in treating re-
pression of traumatic events. Repression is char-
acterized by a curious forgetfulness. The amnesia
that results from repression is curious because "the
affect surrounding the idea remains in conscious-
ness and because the repressed idea has an un-
canny way of returning—albeit in disguised form"
(Vaillant, 1977, p. 128).
The purpose of psychoanalysis is to help the
patients dig under the layer of repression, develop
new insights into their behavior, and find more
flexible ways to cope with their anxiety. It is
premised on the idea that some emotional experi-
ences in childhood are so traumatic that to allow
them to enter into consciousness many years after
they occurred would cause one to be totally over-
whelmed by anxiety. It is thought that such trau-
matic experiences are stored in the unconscious,
or repressed, but that with proper therapeutic
techniques they can be unleashed. Repression is
thus conceptualized in terms -of a retrieval failure,
with access to the critical memories being tempo-
rarily blocked.
The primary evidence for repression comes from
clinical patients, aiicl numerous reports exist in
the literature. Often recoveries from amnesias of
unbearable memories occur through the use of
therapy, hypnosis, or drugs (see Erdelyi & Gold-
berg, 1979). Patients have, through interventions
of this sort, recovered memories of such experiences
as being accideritly buried alive or surviving an
airplane crash, about which they had been hitherto
amnesic. The vividness with which these memo-
ries are reported can indeed be impressive.
EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE
These phenomena seem to offer impressive support
for the belief that information is permanently
stored. However, careful evaluation of the evi-
dence in each case raises rather substantial doubts.
As we shall see, reports of "memories" that occur
either spontaneously or as a result of memory
probes, such as electrical stimulation, hypnosis, or
psychotherapy, may not involve memories of ac-
tual past events at all. Rather, there is good rea-
son to believe that such reports may result from
reconstruction of fragments of past experience
or from constructions created at the time of re-
port that bear little or no resemblance to past
experience. Furthermore, secondary sources and
popular accounts tend to distort the evidence so
as to lend more credence to the notion of memory
permanence than is really warranted.
Brain stimulation. As noted, the work of Pen-
field captured the imagination of psychologists
and has provided perhaps the most widely cited
support for the contention that memories are per-
manent. But let us look more closely at what
Penfield actually found. Penfield began with 1,132
patients, and by his own admission, the patient
responses that might have indicated SL memory
recovery occurred in only 40 cases out of the total
of 1,132 cases surveyed, or'only 3.5% of the time
(Penfield, 1969, p. 154). (In an earlier publica-
tion, however, Penfield and Perot, 1963, noted
that electrical stimulation produced what they
labeled "experiential responses" only when the
electrodes were applied to the cortex of the tem-
poral lobe. This region was explored in S20 of
the patients; thus the 40 patients exhibiting ex-
periential responses constituted 7.7% of this
group.) But in any event, production of these
responses by the stimulating electrode was rela-
tively rare to begin with,
In their 1963 article in Brain, Penfield and Perot
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cortex of conscious patients produced experiential
responses. Of the 40 patients, 24 claimed to have
had an auditory experiential response; that is,
they heard a voice, voices, music, or a meaningful
sound. For example, upon stimulation, one pa-
tient (Case 9) said in a subdued voice, "Oh, a
kind of sound in the distance like people singing."
When asked what they were singing, she replied, "I
don't know. It was like a bunch of old folks in
the background, probably some hymns." Nine-
teen patients claimed to have a visual experiential
response, seeing a person or a group of people, a
scene, or a recognizable object. For example, one
patient (Case 19) claimed to have seen a familiar
man grabbing a stick. Twelve patients reported
combined visual and auditory experiential re-
sponses; that is, they experienced scenes with
appropriate sounds. Penfield and Perot (1963)
seemed to be most impressed with the 22 responses
observed in these 12 people, for they argued that
many of the responses "consisted of an experience
which the patient could easily recognize and iden-
tify as having been part of a previous experience"
(p. 672). Finally, five patients made responses
that were described vaguely; for example, patients
referred to having had "a thought," "a memory,"
"a flash-back," or they may have said "that re-
minded me of something."
When we eliminate the patients who heard only
music or voices and those whose responses were
too vague to classify, we find that less than 5%
of the patients contributed the lifelike experiential
responses for which Penfield's work is so famous.
And a detailed examination of even these patient
protocols leaves one with the distinct feeling that
they are reconstructions or inferences rather than
actual memories. For example, one patient (Case
1) said upon stimulation that she suddenly saw
herself as she had appeared in childbirth, and
that she felt as if she were reliving the experience.
Another (Case 36) said, "I think I heard a mother
calling her little boy somewhere. It seemed to be
something that happened years ago." She said it
was "somebody in the neighborhood where I live."
When the same spot was stimulated 18 minutes
later, she said, "Yes, I hear the same familiar
sounds, it seems to be a woman calling. The
same lady. That was not in the neighborhood. It
seemed to be at the lumberyard." She added that
she had never in her life been around a lumber-
yard. When a patient under stimulation sees her-
self from the sidelines engaged in a particular act,
or experiences people in locations in which she
has never been, there is clear indication that the
individual is not "reliving" the experience but
rather is reconstructing it. A similar interpreta-
tion of brain-stimulation work has been offered by
Neisser (1967):
In short, the content of these experiences is not surprising
in any way. It seems entirely comparable to the content
of dreams, which are generally admitted to be synthetic
constructions and not literal recalls. Penfield's work tells
us nothing new about memory, (p. 169) _.
In sum, Penfield would have us believe that
stimulation of the brain "causes previous experience
to return to the mind of a conscious patient" and
that "there is within the adult brain a remarkable
record of the stream of each individual's aware-
ness or consciousness" (Penfield & Perot, 1963,
p. 692). But these conclusions (and the video-
recorder model), based as they are on the dubious
protocols of a handful of patients, seem unwar-
ranted. A reconstruction or construction hypothe-
sis seems much more viable. A hint as to what
is likely to go into such reconstructions was pro-
vided by Mahl, Rothenberg, Delgado, and Ham-
lin (1964) in their examination of a 27-year-old
housewife who underwent brain stimulation; they
concluded that a strong determinant of the con-
tent of these "memories" is "the patient's 'mental
content' at the time of stimulation" (p. 3'58).
These so-called memories, then, appear to con-
sist merely of the thoughts and ideas that hap-
pened to exist just prior to and during the stimu-
lation,
Hypnosis. Despite apparent successes in using
hypnosis to recover memories, the technique is sub-
ject to a variety of criticisms. First, when it does
work to revive a temporarily inaccessible memory,
hypnosis does not necessarily involve the awesome,
mysterious power that many apparently attribute
to it. Rather, it may simply be that hypnosis
encourages people to relax more, to cooperate
more, or to concentrate more than they otherwise
would. Put another way, the argument is that
hypnosis is best understood in terms of the inter-
personal relationship existing between hypnotist
and subject. A good relationship results in the
subject's behaving in a way that is pleasing to the
hypnotist, that is, in a way in which the subject
perceives a good hypnotic subject should behave
(Hilgard, 1977; Evans & Kihlstrom, Note 1).
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rather than improved access to stored information.
That is, rather than being more able, the subject
may simply be more willing to report information
in the hypnosis setting than under ordinary cir-
cumstances.
In support of this criterion-shift hypothesis is
the fact that although hypnotized subjects who are
asked to recall or relive former experiences often
produce a wealth of recollections, much of this
material is fabricated. There exists no evidence
to support the view that recall during a state of
hypnosis is any more accurate or complete than
recall under ordinary waking conditions (Barber,
196S; Neisser, 1967). Even more dramatic, sev-
eral experiments have shown that subjects under
hypnosis will confidently recall events not only
from the past but from the future as well (Kline,
19S8; Rubenstein & Newman, 1954). In response
to this somewhat muddied state of affairs, many
researchers have voiced strong objections to the
use of hypnosis in the legal arena. An article in
the American Bar Association Journal recently
argued:
People can flat-out lie under hypnosis, and the examiner
is no better equipped to detect the hypnotic lie than any
other kind. Even more serious, a willing hypnotic sub-
ject is more pliable than he normally would be, more
anxious to please his questioner. Knowing even a few
details of an event, often supplied in early contacts with
police, may provide the subject with enough basis to create
a highly detailed "memory" of what transpired, whether
he was there or not. ("Hypnotized Man Remembers Too
Much," 1978, p. 187)
Spontaneous and prompted recoveries. The re-
covery of items that appear to have been forgot-
ten certainly does happen, but this does not, of
course, constitute evidence that all or even many
memories are recoverable. If we traveled to Hol-
land and saw one yellow tulip, that obviously
would not provide evidence that all tulips are yel-
low. Even after seeing an acre of yellow tulips,
we would not be surprised to walk a mile down
the road and find a field of tulips that were red.
Similarly, in the case of memory, the existence of
examples of successful recoveries should not imply
that all memories are potentially recoverable.
Thus the vast evidence that fantasy activities
can result in the emergence of initially unreported
elements of a stimulus does not imply that all
memories are potentially recoverable. In fact,
from a thoughtful application of signal-detection
analysis, Erdelyi (1970) concluded that fantasy
activities did nothing to intensify the memory for
the stimulus but, rather, affected the response
rates: "While fantasy generation increases the ex-
tent to which information is outputted from mem-
ory storage, the input traces in memory storage
do not themselves become intensified" (p. 111).
Fantasy activities apparently induce people to
adopt a less stringent criterion for reporting, so
that low-confidence memory items are recalled
when otherwise they might not have been reported.
Psychoanalysis, Our remarks on the subject
of memory recovery also apply to psychoanalysis.
In fact, Erdelyi's (1970) conclusions were based
largely on work involving free-association tech-
niques, one of the principal methods used in psy-
choanalysis,
In terms of the recovery of repressed memories,
even some of those who believe in the concept of
repression have argued that it is possible that
subjects purportedly recovering lost memories are
in fact generating not memories of true events but
fanciful guesses, fantasies, or plain confabulations
(Erdelyi & Goldberg, 1979). The major methodo-
logical problem is that for the most part, inde-
pendent verification of the accuracy of the "mem-
ory" produced by the subject can never be ob-
tained. In reviewing the available evidence,
Neisser (1967) has flatly stated that these re-
coveries are "not a fully accurate copy of earlier
experience" (p. 169).
Some Retrieval Failures
Our emphasis thus far has been on the use of dif-
ferent techniques designed to produce recovery of
memories that have at one time or another been
temporarily unavailable. What we have tried to
illustrate is that the results of these techniques
must be viewed with a highly jaundiced eye. They
do not, contrary to popular belief, provide support
for anything like a videorecorder memory.
On the other side of the coin, we cannot deny
that successful recoveries can and do occur. Our
argument is with the contention that all memories
are potentially recoverable. In this section, we
shall offer some speculations about the circum-
stances under which a particular memory trace
may be altered or obliterated.
MEMORY DISTORTION IN THE LABORATORY
One of us (EL) has, over the past several years,
been investigating circumstances under which re-
AMEKICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • MAY 1980 • 415ports of real-world, complex events can undergo
systematic and predictable distortions (Loftus,
1975, 1977, 1979a, 1979b; Loftus & Palmer, 1974).
To get an idea of the flavor of this research, con-
sider the following experiment reported by Loftus,
Miller, and Burns (1978). The subjects viewed a
series of 30 color slides depicting successive stages
in an auto-pedestrian accident. The auto was a
red Datsun seen traveling along a side street
toward an intersection with a stop sign for half
of the subjects, and toward an intersection with
a yield sign for the remaining subjects. The re-
maining slides show the Datsun turning right and
knocking down a pedestrian who is crossing at
the crosswalk. Immediately after viewing the
slides, the subjects answered a series of 20 ques-
tions. For half of the subjects, Question 17 was
"Did another car pass the red Datsun while it
was stopped at the stop sign?" The remaining
subjects were asked the same question with the
words "stop sign" replaced by "yield sign." The
assignment of subjects to conditions produced a
factorial design in which half of the subjects re-
ceived consistent or correct information, whereas
the other half received misleading or incorrect in-
formation. After a short filler activity, a two-
forced-choice recognition test was administered.
Two slide projectors were used to present IS pairs
of slides, each pair being presented for about 8
seconds. For each pair of slides, the subjects were
asked to select the slide they had seen earlier.
The critical pair consisted of a slide depicting a
red Datsun at a stop sign and another slide, nearly
identical, except that it depicted the Datsun at a
yield sign. The results showed that when the
intervening question contained misleading informa-
tion, recognition performance was hindered. In
one condition, for example, over 80% of the sub-
jects who received misleading information re-
sponded incorrectly on the forced-choice recogni-
tion test. They indicated that they had seen the
slide that corresponded to what they had been
told rather than the slide that they had actually
seen.
A major thrust of this and related research has
been a practical one: It provides a warning, for
example, that eyewitness accounts occurring in
such situations as courtroom trials and insurance
investigations can be highly suspect. Of interest
in the present essay, however, is the relation be-
tween the eyewitness report and the memorial in-
formation that underlies it. Three hypotheses
seem viable. The first, relatively uninteresting,
might be termed a "supplementation of nothing"
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, many
subjects simply fail to store information about the
critical object (say the stop sign) at the time of
original viewing. The postperceptual (mislead-
ing) information (corresponding to the yield sign
in this example) is then added to the memory
representation of the event and thereby forms the
basis for the subsequent report.
A variety of data allow us to reject this possi-
bility. First, when given no misleading informa-
tion, and when tested immediately after the inci-
dent, over 90% of the subjects correctly identified
the sign they had seen. This result suggests that
the information did register itself in long-term
memory. Second, one group of subjects viewed
the incident and then filled in a diagram with all
the details they could remember; more than half
of them drew in the correct sign. This finding
suggests that at least half of the subjects encoded
the sign to the point of including it in their dia-
gram. In fact, it underestimates the actual num-
ber who encoded the sign, since others may have
encoded it but not bothered to draw it in their dia-
gram (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978). Taken to-
gether, these results indicate that at least some of
those subjects whose recollection changed as a re-
sult of misleading information actually did store
the critical information in the first place.
The other two hypotheses about the relation
between the eyewitness report and the underlying
memorial information bear directly on the perma-
nence issue. A coexistence (permanence) hypoth-
esis would hold that the postperceptual informa-
tion is added to the memory representation, where
it coexists with the original information. The
test report then rests on a choice between these
two competing alternatives. A substitution hy-
pothesis, on the other hand, would claim that the
postperceptual information replaces the original
information and that in the process, the original
information is forever banished from the subject's
memory.
EVIDENCE FOR SUBSTITUTION
Can we distinguish between these two hypotheses?
As noted earlier, it is not possible to unequivocally
reject the coexistence hypothesis, since failing to
find a member of a supposedly coexisting pair does
not logically imply that the elusive member does
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evidence against the coexistence hypothesis by
devising experiments that attempt, in as rigorous
a way as possible, to uncover the original informa-
tion. If such attempts fail, then we can conclude
that the information may have vanished—and that
for all practical purposes, it has vanished. What
follows is a brief description of some rigorous at-
tempts to recover the original information. None
of them succeeded in finding it once it had been
tampered with.
Testing method. As we have said, it is not at
all difficult to take someone who has seen one
object, say a stop sign, and cause him or her to
recollect actually seeing another object, in this
case a yield sign. The method of probing for a
recollection seems to matter very little. We can
ask, "Did you see a yield sign?" and obtain the
response "yes." We can ask, "What type of
traffic sign did you see?" and obtain the response
"a yield sign." We can ask, "Was it a stop sign
or a yield sign?" and obtain the answer "yield."
And, what is most impressive, we can present,
side by side, pictures of the two signs and find that
the yield sign is the choice. This last recognition
test is particularly compelling, for the subject re-
jects the stimulus that is identical to the one
actually seen. If recognition were assumed to be
a relatively passive process of matching stimuli to
specific locations in a content-addressable storage
system, one would expect that a representation of
the actual and true scene would result in a match
and that an alteration would fail to match. This
does not occur.
Also relevant is the finding that warning people
just prior to a test that some misinformation may
have been presented earlier does not enable them
to reject that misinformation in favor of their
original memory. Put another way, once the mis-
information has been incorporated into memory,
a later warning is unable to help in the recovery
of what was initially seen (Loftus, 1979a),
Demand characteristics. It is natural to ask
whether these results are due to demand character-
istics. Perhaps observant subjects discern the ex-
perimental hypothesis. Obliging subjects may then
try to confirm that hypothesis. In the context of
the stop sign/yield sign study, it is possible that
some or all of the subjects not only remembered
which traffic sign they had observed but also re-
membered what they had been "told" and then
went along with what they believed to be -the ex-
perimental hypothesis, choosing the sign that they
had heard about rather than the one they had
actually seen. Loftus, Miller, and Burns (1978,
Experiment 2) devised a way to test this notion.
Subjects who had participated in the sign-altering
experiment were told, just before leaving the ex-
periment, the exact purpose of the experiment.
They were told that they had seen either a stop
sign or a yield sign and that their questionnaire
had presupposed the existence of one sign or the
other. Their task was to guess which condition
they had been in. In other words, this final de-
briefing activity gave the subjects the opportunity
to be completely insightful about their condition
in the experiment. Of those who had been given
misleading sign information and had been fooled
by it, nearly 90% still insisted they had seen the
sign that corresponded to what they had been told.
Incentives. It could be argued that the reason
so many people go along with misleading informa-
tion is that they are not highly motivated to be
accurate. If high incentive were provided for ac-
curate responding, perhaps people would show evi-
dence that their memories were accurate. For
example, if subjects were offered $1, or $S, or even
$25 for correct responding, would their choice
still be for the yield sign that they had read about
over the stop sign that they had actually seen?
Loftus (1979a) found the answer to be yes. When
no reward was offered, 75% of the subjects chose
the incorrect sign; with a $1 reward, 80%, with
a $S reward, 10%, and with a $25 reward, 85%
of the subjects rejected the true sign in favor of
the incorrect alternative. In sum, subjects actually
performed slightly less accurately when an in-
centive was provided.
Second guesses. A second-guess technique is
particularly well suited for investigating whether
original information and new information coexist
in memory or whether original information is
altered by what occurs subsequently. The logic
of this technique is as follows: At the time sub-
jects are asked for their recollections of an event,
they first guess among fixed alternatives, and if
they guess incorrectly, they choose among the re-
maining uncommitted alternatives; if they choose
correctly on the second guess at a level higher than
chance, then they must have had some information
available about the correct response, in spite of
the error on the first guess. A variation of this
technique has been used successfully in the study
of psychophysical thresholds (Swets, Tanner y &
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& Chapanis, 1953), and paired-associate learning
(Bregman, 1966).
Loftus (197Qa) performed a second-guess ex-
periment using memory for colors. In one study,
the subjects viewed a series of slides depicting a
complex incident involving several people. Some
subjects saw one slide that showed a man sitting
down and reading a book with a green cover.
Subsequently, these individuals were exposed to
information indicating that the cover was a differ-
ent color, say yellow. Later all the subjects were
tested on their memory for the details of the slides;
they picked colors that best represented their
recollection of critical objects. For each object,
they were also asked to indicate their second
choice, assuming that the first choice was incor-
rect. In brief, the results showed that the sub-
jects did not choose correctly on the second guess
at a level higher than chance.
The same result was obtained in an experiment
using memory for objects. The subjects looked
at the stop/yield sequence, viewing either a stop
sign or a yield sign. They returned to the labora-
tory after one week, at which time a questionnaire
subtly told them that they had seen either a stop
sign, a yield sign, or a no-parking sign. After
a filler activity, they were tested. The critical
test item asked them to indicate their recollection
of the type of sign they had seen on the corner
by choosing among fixed alternatives. They also
indicated their second choice. Here, too, we found
that when subjects were initially wrong, and 90%
of them were, their second guesses showed basically
chance performance. In short, the pattern of re-
sponses in these experiments suggests that the sub-
jects had completely lost the original information
about the correct alternative.
Hypnosis, Despite the fact that hypnosis can
result in the "recollection" of facts that never
occurred, there are those who are still impressed
with its power to reveal original memory traces.
To determine whether this technique could enable
an individual whose memory had been altered to
"return to the truth," Putnam (1979) conducted
a study in which the subjects were first shown
a videotape of an accident involving a car and a
bicycle. After some delay, the subjects received
a questionnaire that asked some objective ques-
tions and some that contained misleading informa-
tion. Some of the subjects were questioned under
hypnosis whereas others were not. The hypno-
tized subjects were told that "under hypnosis
it would be possible for them to see the entire
accident again just as clearly as they had seen it
the first time, only this time they would be able
to slow it down or zoom in on details if they chose
to" (p. 442). Putnam found more errors were
made by the subjects in the hypnosis condition,
particularly on the leading questions. He inter-
preted these results to indicate that hypnosis does
not reduce retrieval difficulties and allow subjects
to retrieve a veridical memorial representation.
Quite the contrary, subjects appear to be "more
suggestible in the hypnotic state and are, therefore,
more easily influenced by the leading questions" (p.
444). Suggesting the existence of a license plate,
when in fact none had been visible at all, not only
induced hypnotic subjects to say they had seen
it but prompted them to offer partial descriptions
of the license number. One subject said it was a
California plate which began with W or V, and
this obviously constructed information was not
obtained under any duress. Suggesting that the
major character's hair was blond, when actually
it was black, caused hypnotized subjects to "re-
member" blond hair. Showing these subjects the
videotape again caused some consternation. One
subject said, "It's really strange because I still
have the blond girl's face in my mind and it
doesn't correspond to her (pointing to the woman
on the videotape) , . , it was really weird" (p.
444).
IMPLICATIONS
The net result of these studies is a strong sus-
picion that substitution has occurred—that the
misleading information has irrevocably replaced
the original information in the subject's brain. The
suggestion is that some aspects of the original
representation of a complex event are fragile in-
deed. When the memory of an event is called to
consciousness, there appears to be a potential for
substitution to occur. It is reasonable to suppose
that memory is not necessarily permanent.
What then of the coexistence possibility? Im-
plicit in our remarks has been the notion that
substitution and coexistence are not mutually ex-
clusive .mechanisms of the mind. Classical inter-
ference-theory experiments have certainly indi-
cated that A-B and A-C responses can be simul-
taneously maintained in memory (cf. Crowder,
1976). And instances of coexistence are abundant
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Jacqueline Onassis was once Jacqueline Kennedy.
Assuming then that both substitution and co-
existence are possible, a major question then con-
fronts the memory theorist: Under what circum-
stances does one process rather than the other
occur? As a start toward answering this ques-
tion, we suggest that the mechanism responsible
for updating memory both seeks efficiency and
takes account of real-world constraints. In a
situation that permits logical (real-world) coexist-
ence, memorial coexistence is likewise allowed.
Thus, the Stimulus A may be attached to both
B and C, and similarly, to illustrate, allowance is
made for the fact that the former First Lady
may undergo a name change in accord with her
marital status. Often, however, real-world co-
existence is logically forbidden. The automobile
that was involved in the accident that we recently
experienced stopped either at a stop sign or at a
yield sign, but it did not stop at both. The shirt
worn by the thief was not simultaneously green and
blue. In such instances, the most economical pro-
cedure may be to dismiss one memory in favor of
the other, much as a computer programmer will
irrevocably destroy an old program instruction
when a new one is created.
The implication of the notion of nonpermanent
memory is that it should give pause to all who
rely on obtaining a "truthful" version of an event
from someone who experienced that event in the
past. Clinical psychologists, counselors, and psy-
chiatrists who use the anamnestic interview to gain
information about the prior events in someone's
life typically do so to be able to make intelligent
decisions about what kind of help should be given.
Anthropologists, sociologists, and some experi-
mental psychologists query people about their past
in the course of studying some particular problem
of interest to social science. It is important to
realize that the statements made during such in-
terviews may not be particularly accurate as re-
ports of prior events. The contents of an inter-
view may not reflect a person's earlier experiences
and attitudes so much as his or her current pic-
ture of the past. It may not be possible, in some
instances, to ever discover from interviewing some-
one what actually happened in that person's past.
Not only might the originally acquired memory
have departed from reality in some systematic way,
but the memory may have been continually sub-
ject to change after it was initially stored.
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